

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD506390

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; DEC 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Army Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.
Document partially illegible.

AUTHORITY

ago d/a ltr 9 may 1975 ago d/a ltr 9 may 1975

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD-506390

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY:

 AGC, D/A

 ltw.

9 May 75

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY


MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**

CONFIDENTIAL



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (3 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693331

16 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff

**Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Chief of Research and Development

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Engineers

Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command

Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Air University Library

Defense Documentation Center

Security Officer, Hudson Institute

USAF Project RAND

Commanding Officers

US Army Limited War Laboratory

US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-0

8 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for the period ending 31 July 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,
APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO
San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San
Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) Personnel Management

(a) Command Military Strength: Military strength, both authorized and assigned, have remained fairly constant throughout the past three months. We have undergone our largest period of steady officer losses and it is anticipated that the gains will begin to balance out the losses by the end of August.

	31 May 69		30 Jun 69		31 Jul 69	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
OFF	491	455	496	429	496	406
WO	145	152	139	131	139	141
TNL	9004	8608	8988	8615	8988	8263
TOTAL	9640	9215	9623	9183	9623	8779

(b) Local National Civilian Programs: On 28 March 1969 a Department of the Army hiring freeze was placed on all local national civilian positions. This has had a significant impact on the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh which has hired only 929 of the 1106 local nationals authorized.

FOR OFFUT

69331

Inclosure

1

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Program 6 Civilianization: The Support Command had attained 100% of its Program 6 hiring objective (926) prior to the close of the last quarter. An additional 10% overhire was authorized to insure all positions would remain full despite the normal attrition of local national personnel. A major problem still exists, however, due to the civilianization of many positions in which local nationals cannot be used for security reasons. There are 310 spaces which have been withdrawn under Program 6 in which security requirements preclude the use of local nationals.

(d) Local National Direct Hire Civilian Employees: The direct hire authorization for US Army Depot, Can Ranh was decreased from 1328 to 1106 on 1 May 69. On 31 July 69 there were 922 positions filled. Due to the fact that the majority of the positions require skilled employees and that skilled personnel are not available, this area remains a significant LN' problem.

(e) Local National Civilian Training Programs: Though intensive training of LN's continues, the hiring freeze is again coming into the picture. Many of the personnel within the present resources have been trained and now additional LN's are needed for training. USARV approved 34 spaces for stevedore training, using AT&T funds for payment.

(2) Personnel Services Division:

(a) A change to USASUPCOM-CR2 Regulation 210-2 was published on 31 July 1969 to eliminate an inconsistency which allowed any eligible person, regardless of rank, over the age of 21 years to purchase alcoholic beverages, but then restricted personnel below the grade of E6 from keeping alcoholic beverages in their billets. The change to the regulation prohibits personnel below the grade of E6 and under 21 years of age from purchasing alcoholic beverages. It also requires that the liquor portion of ration cards be voided for those personnel not authorized to purchase alcoholic beverages. USARV has adopted this policy for implementation throughout RVM.

(b) The 1969 Joint Annual Fund Campaign for Army Emergency Relief and the Army Relief Society is being conducted throughout this command during the period 1st June through 1st August 1969. The money raised by this campaign is used to assist servicemen and their families in meeting financial emergencies. During the period 1st June through 14 July 1969, contributions totaled \$3,727.10 for AER/ARS Campaign.

(c) In order to increase the retention of junior officers, a letter was sent to all units in this command on 29 June 1969 requiring that each Efficiency Report review for a company grade officer be shown to the officer so that the full advantage of the continual counseling effort could be realized.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) On 28 April 1969 the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay Junior Officers Council held its first meeting for the purpose of assisting the Commander in being responsive to the welfare, requirements and interests of younger officers. Of particular concern to the council has been conditions at the Officers' Quarters at Cam Ranh Bay.

(e) By a letter dated 4 May 1969, Headquarters, USARV requested a review of all open mess accounts within each geographical area to eliminate excessive numbers of open mess accounts. USARV Regulation 230-60 provides that only one of each type open mess (Officer, NCO, EM) will be established at any one installation or geographical location except as authorized by USARV. In accordance with these USARV objectives, the 54th General Support Group incorporated the following open messes into the Nha Trang Officers' Open Mess and Nha Trang NCO/EM Open Mess:

RV 2342 8th Field Hospital NCO/EM Open Mess
RV 2343 17th Aviation Group Officers' Open Mess (Cockpit Club)
RV 2344 17th Aviation Group NCO/EM Open Mess (Contango Lounge)
RV 2467 I FFORCEV NCO/EM Open Mess
RV 2476 220th Signal Company EM Open Mess (Islander Inn)

(3) Military Justice:

(a) During the reporting period a total of 70 Special and 20 Summary Courts-Martial cases were advised, processed and reviewed by this office. 73 Article 15 punishments were checked for legal sufficiency and 76 appeals adjudicated.

(b) Legal Opinions: A total of 31 written opinions were rendered.

(c) Claims: A total of 30 claims under the military claims act were received of which 30 have been paid. Dollar amounts of claims processed are as follows:

1 Claims received: \$6,277.55
2 Claims paid: \$5,361.71

(d) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to military and civilian personnel in the Cam Ranh Bay Area increased considerably from the last reporting period to 1,951 cases. The following is break-down by category:

1 Adoption and changes of names: 70
2 Citizenship and Immigration: 68
3 Domestic Relations: 325

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 Non-Support: 17
- 5 Personal Finances: 190
- 6 Power of Attorney: 439
- 7 Personal Property: 32
- 8 Taxation: 100
- 9 Torts: 5
- 10 Wills and Estates: 95
- 11 Miscellaneous: 610

(4) Base Postal Office: This postal area has been subdivided into two distinct operations, mail movement and financial operations. Statistics shown below, include APO's subordinate to the 39th FPO.

(a) Financial Operations:

1 Money Order Sales

May	\$1,234,481.62
June	\$1,341,619.57
July	\$1,278,585.78

2 Parcel Post Sales

May	\$24,376.00
June	\$24,600.00
July	\$20,440.00

(b) Mail Movement Operations

1 Outgoing Mail

May	312,780 pounds
June	361,062 pounds
July	306,493 pounds

2 Incoming Mail (excluding Sealand)

May	369,519 pounds
June	324,422 pounds
July	354,809 pounds

3 Incoming Mail (Sealand only)

May	510,480 pounds
June	163,102 pounds
July	125,509 pounds

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Locator - this area reflects improperly addressed mail that has been directorized at APO 96312.

May	23,398 pieces
June	19,290 pieces
July	22,162 pieces

- (5) Reenlistments: See Inclosure 1
- (6) Unit Personnel Testing: See Inclosure 2
- (7) Casualties: See Inclosure 3
- (8) Unclassified Promotions: See Inclosure 4
- (9) Vistors: See Inclosure 5
- (10) Congressional Inquiries: See Inclosure 6
- (11) Awards:

(a) Submitted to this headquarters and forward to 1st Logistical Command for final processing: See Inclosure 7

(b) Recommendations which were approved and finalized by 1st Logistical Command: See Inclosure 8

b. ACoS, Security, Plans and Operations

(1) Security and Intelligence:

(a) Clearance Actions: During the reporting period, a total of 458 requests for personnel security actions were received and a total of 455 clearances were granted or validated. As of 31 July 1969, 53 clearance actions were pending.

(b) Document Security:

1 Scheduled 10% inventories of secret documents were conducted on 3 May 1969, 23 June 1969, and 10 July 1969.

2 A review of recurring security deficiencies noted during counterintelligence inspections was completed on 26 July 1969. The recurring deficiencies and appropriate corrective actions were identified in a 29 July 1969 Command Letter. Subordinate commands were directed to take immediate action to prevent the recurrence of these deficiencies.

(c) War Trophy Registration: A total of 162 war trophies were screened for intelligence value in accordance with USARV Regulation 643-20 during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Ground Defense:

1 A revised Cam Ranh Peninsula Ground Defense Plan was published and disseminated on 15 June 1969. The revised plan incorporates lesser learned during the initial phases of the Peninsula Defense Coordination System and updates existing defense communication facilities.

2 An Army Sector Ground Defense Plan was published and disseminated on 15 July 1969. Its publication established a separate plan for the Army Sector of responsibility and provided specific guidance to tenant units.

3 On 10 May 1969, construction was begun on the underground hardened site for the Joint Defense Operations Center. The hardened site, located 20 meters north of the Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, is expected to be completed by late August 1969.

4 By mid-June 1969, both sole user landline and FM radio communication were established between the Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC) and the 18th Engineer Brigade Combined Tactical Operations Center (CTOC). The CTOC was established as the area defense coordination center in late May 1969 by the 18th Engineer Brigade.

5 A peninsula liaison team consisting of one officer and two enlisted personnel was furnished to the CTOC on 21 July 1969 in compliance with a recommendation contained in the 2-4 June 1969 I Field Force Vietnam security inspection of Cam Ranh Peninsula.

6 From 2-4 June 1969, an I Field Force Vietnam team conducted a follow-up security inspection of Cam Ranh Peninsula physical security ground defense systems. The team noted considerable improvement in area security. Major deficiencies noted were the need for expeditious implementation of a pass control system, the necessity for a liaison team to CTOC, land clearing in the vicinity of the ammunition and POL storage areas, and the construction of alternate security lighting for pier areas.

7 From 3-7 July 1969, representatives of 1st Logistical Command conducted a follow-up survey of corrective actions taken to security deficiencies noted during the September 1968 MACV Board of Inquiry and subsequent inspections by 1st Logistical Command, I Field Force Vietnam, I FFORCEV Artillery, USARV and MACV. The 1st Logistical Command team found that nearly all of the recommendations made by the original MACV Board of Inquiry and subsequent inspecting teams had been implemented. Requests had been submitted for assistance in corrective actions beyond the capability of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

(2) Plans, Training and Force Development

(a) Replacement Training

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Average monthly attendance of Replacement Training was 885. Command interest is continuously being stressed to insure that all incoming personnel are scheduled for Replacement Training.

2 The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter:

<u>Course</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Engineer Logistic School (PLL Training)	Weekly

(b) Plans:

1 T-Day Planning. Activity during the reporting period was limited to review of 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 69-69.

2 Resource Reviews. During the reporting period, Resource Reviews of this Support Command's major subordinate commands and headquarters elements were accomplished. Review of the headquarters resulted in a recommendation to eliminate 6 officer, 2 warrant officer and 10 enlisted spaces from HHD, USASUPCOM-CRB. The review of major subordinate commands, including Post, Camp and Station Augmentation to the 500th Transportation Group, resulted in identification of a resources shortfall of 716 military and 164 local national spaces.

(c) Force Development

1 During the reporting period there were no unit gains or losses within this Command.

2 Major force development actions initiated during the reporting period were the submission of MTDAs for the Duffel Bag Facility; US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam; and Post, Camp and Station Augmentation to the 54th General Support and the 500th Transportation Groups.

3 The only major force development action completed during the reporting period was promulgation of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh MTDAs P5W04DAA01 and P5W04DAA02. The former MDTA adds five Signal Officers and the latter adds construction and communication equipment, and vehicles.

(3) Logistical Operations: USASUPCOM-CRB continued its mission of supporting the southern II Corps area.

(a) In accomplishing its mission, the Support Command shipped the following amounts of cargo by long haul convoy:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>NO CONVOYS</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>S/T DRY CARGO</u>	<u>GALLONS POL</u>
21	Ban Me Thuot	3,225	1,790,000
11	Bao Loc	3,432	430,000
19	Dalat	6,115	725,000
2	Phan Thiet	580	55,000

(b) This represents an increase of over 43% in the number of convoys run during the last reporting period. Wet cargo shipped increased 20% while the amount of dry cargo decreased by 31%. Convoy planning, to include security, priority of cargo, and monitoring of transportation assets, were controlled from the Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC). Each convoy was inspected by a Field Grade Officer of the Command prior to departure for the purpose of challenging cargo being transported, insuring proper loading, and checking safety of vehicles. Tactical units providing security and end stations were notified by message and telephonically prior to convoy departure to insure convoy security and rapid backloading operations.

(4) Unit Moves: The 2/1 Armored Cav Squadron has moved from the Pleiku area where it was operating with the 4th Infantry Division, to the Song Mao area. Under OPCON Task Force South, the 2/1 has been assigned the mission of clearing QL1 from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet and general pacification of the area. The 2/1 consists of a headquarters troop, 3 line troops, and 1 air cav troop. Movement of the 2/1 has had a great impact on the Support Command, since it is the first armor unit to be deployed in the Comand's A/O. For the first time, the Command has been tasked with the responsibility of approximately 128 tracked vehicles in addition to wheel vehicles and 26 aircraft. Support for the 2/1 is being accomplished through Phan Rang and Phan Thiet LSA's, with supplies being delivered to the units by convoy, CH47, and AF C130's. With the additional security the 2/1 is providing on QL1, this Command is again running convoys to the Phan Thiet LSA.

(5) Logistical Operations: The LOCC continued to monitor Project Duffel Bag, advise the Commander on Duffel Bag operations, and provide staff assistance to the facility. Since the last reporting period, three 4,000 sq ft buildings have been constructed and operations moved into the new facility. The original building is now being used for in/out shipment processing. Two of the new buildings have environmental control systems, required for equipment processing and storage. The third building is used for ambient storage. The expansion of the operation was the result of an increased production requirement placed on the Duffel Bag Facility by MACV. To accomplish this, a TDA has been submitted for the additional personnel required, and accompanied by a request for a 120 day temporary loan of equipment. The Duffel Bag program is continuing to receive

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

maximum attention from all levels involved and is greatly proving its worthiness in the field.

(6) Air Drop Operations: During the reporting period the 109th Aerial Delivery Company conducted four (4) air drop operations consisting of a total of 443.14 short/tons. C-130 Aircraft were used for a total of 29 sorties. Classes I, IV and V were delivered using the container delivery system. An additional 30.08 S/T of Class V were rigged for airdrop but was later flown to an intermediate airfield where it was off loaded and transported to the target area by helilift.

(7) Helilift Inspection and Training: The command maintained two (2) teams of helilift oriented personnel within the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery) to conduct Helilift Training and for the inspection of helilift slings in the using units. Three (3) teams were dispatched during the reporting period. The team that went to Phan Thiet to train personnel of the 2/1 Cav later participated in actual rigging of the supplies. The 2/1 requested this assistance as they were experiencing a shortage of trained personnel. The operation lasted from 6 Jun until 15 Jul 69 with approximately 395 sorties, consisting of internal and external loads. Minor problems, were encountered until the receiving unit in the forward area placed additional emphasis on returning the slings and containers for re-use.

c. ACofS, Maintenance:

(1) M107/110 Self Propelled Artillery: The quarterly service program on M107/110 Self Propelled Artillery continues at a pace consistent with personnel assets.

(a) To date, 5 ea M107/110 have been completed under Phase II modification.

(b) One other M107/110 has been scheduled for R&R.

(c) A central repair facility for selected hydraulic components of the M107/110 family of weapons is being established at the Vinnell Corp at Cam Ranh Bay. Vinnell will repair these components and return them to incountry depots on a percentage basis.

(2) Engines:

(a) The rate of consumption on 3/4 ton and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton engines continues at a high pace. This has been attributed to improper initial inspection procedures and poor utilization of authorized test equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) An automotive engine diagnostic school is presently being established. This will be conducted within each group and is intended to be refresher course for 62 and 63 "13 group mechanical maintenance personnel.

d. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Attachment of Movements Control Center to ACofS, Transportation: Effective 1 May 1969, the Movements Control Center was transferred from the 124th Transportation Command to the USASUPCOM-CRB. The MCCA has not yet been approved for this organization, requiring attachment of personnel to this operation from various subordinate commands.

(2) Retrograde Responsibility: On 15 July the ACofS, Transportation was given the responsibility for retrograde reporting and coordination. In conjunction with this, an officer from ACofS, Transportation was appointed to the SEE/MOVE Team for retrograde activities at US Army Depot-CRB.

(3) Highway Operations: During this quarter, convoy operations have decreased primarily due to completion of engineer supply shipments for road construction. Local and port and beach operations have become increasingly hampered by personnel shortages and overage equipment failure.

(4) Terminal and Water Transportation Operations: During this quarter, total port activity has remained at a lower level than reached in the last two months of the previous quarter. Even with the lower activity, port operations have been hampered by a reduction in military stevedores, increased ammunition shipments, and lack of port clearance highway assets.

(5) Unit Moves: During the first of June, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Cavalry Squadron moved into Phan Thiet and the USASUPCOM-CRB Logistical Support Area. The requirement for transportation to that area has been increased since that time.

(6) Air movement of milk from CRB to outlying areas has become an increasing problem. Missed flights have remained numerous during this reporting period, and still remain a problem in providing adequate milk to outlying areas.

e. ACofS, Ammunition

(1) Class V Stockage Objectives, management levels, and quantities on hand at the beginning and end of period in short tons.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) GENERAL:

<u>LOCATION:</u>		<u>BEG</u>	<u>END</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	S/O	879	929
	M/L	643	679
	O/H	644	1130
Ban Me Thuot LSA	S/O	528	CLOSED
	M/L	388	15 July 69
	O/H	600	
Bao Loc LSA	S/O	291	CLOSED
	M/L	213	3 July 69
	O/H	260	
Dalat LSA	S/O	OPENED	328
	M/L	1 June 69	215
	O/H		355
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	S/O	45743	48328
	M/L	36966	4200
	O/H	40666	36225

(b) DISCUSSION:

1 Stockage objectives are based on weapons densities, usage rates published in USARPAC Reg 710-15, issue experience, and storage capacity. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes a 25 day backup for Da Nang and a 15 day backup for Qui Nhon.

2 The Bao Loc ASP was closed 3 July 69 due to the small average daily issues, reduced requirements for US Forces in the area and reduction of security capability. The Ban Me Thuot ASP was closed 15 July 69 due to reduction of security capability resulting from movement of CIDG security forces out of the area. Resupply is accomplished by through-put based on unit requisitions.

3 The Dalat ASP was opened officially by SUPCOM on 1 June 69. One 5 cell module and two 2 cell modules, for a total of 9 pads, are being utilized at Dalat.

4 The stockage objective for Phan Thiet and Dalat LSA's is computed using weapons densities and the intensive combat rate, theater sustaining rate and past issue experience. The stockage objective for Phan Thiet has increased during the past quarter. The Phan Thiet and Dalat stockage objectives are expected to remain stable during the coming quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL
11

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Storage capability is based on the planning factor of 1 short ton per 1¹. square feet of storage space. Planned construction in ASA CHARLIE at Cam Ranh Bay will increase the storage capacity by approximately 19,000 S/T. The total storage capacity at the beginning and end of the reporting period in short tons is as follows:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BEG</u>	<u>END</u>
Phan Thiet	1,750	1,750
Dalat	Opened 1 Jun 69	1,250
Cam Ranh Bay	76,127	76,127

(3) Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>REC (MAY)</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC (JUNE)</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC (JULY)</u>	<u>ISS</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	226	214	1359	1001	1630	1312
Ban Me Thuot LSA	517	643	448	656	160	268
Dalat LSA	N/A	N/A	241	200	409	219
Bao Loc LSA	238	190	176	192	0	245
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	11,100	20,500	21,900	13,400	3,452	13,793

(4) Ammunition Depot Road Networks: The upgrading of the road network in ASA YANKEE is expected to be complete by 15 August. This project was initiated in June and was accomplished utilizing Support Command assets. The connecting road between ASAs YANKEE and CHARLIE was begun on 7 July 1969. When complete, this road will allow transportation of ammunition from Pier 5 to ASA YANKEE without passing through the cantonment area.

f. ACofS, Supply

(1) Representatives of the ACofS, Supply made liaison visits to the following areas and customers in these areas on the dates indicated below:

- (a) 3-4 May Phan Rang
- (b) 9 May Dalat
- (c) 15 May North Nha Trang and Ninh Hoa
- (d) 16 May Ban Me Thuot, Bao Loc, Phan Thiet, Gia Nghia
- (e) 23 May Phan Rang
- (f) 26 May USA Depot, Cam Ranh Cold Storage
- (g) 30 May Nha Trang

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(h) 3 June Ban Me Thuot and Dalat
(i) 4 June Phan Rang
(j) 6-7 June Ban Me Thuot
(k) 12 June Phan Thiet
(l) 16-17 June Bao Loc
(m) 24 June Cam Ranh Bay
(n) 9-10 July Nha Trang
(o) 11 July Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Dalat
(p) 19 July Dalat, Phan Thiet
(q) 23 July Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc

(2) Special assistance visits were made to the following locations on the dates indicated:

(a) 10-14 May Dalat Class I
(b) 30 July 5th Special Forces Gp

(3) Support of the Dalat Logistical Support Activity was transferred from the Phan Rang Class I Supply Point to the Cam Ranh Bay Class I Supply Point on 11 May 69. Support of the Bao Loc Losistical Support Activity was transferred from Phan Rang to Cam Ranh Bay on 25 May 1969. The subsistence support given these two Logistical Support Activities from the Cam Ranh Bay Class I Supply Point has been outstanding.

(4) The monthly subsistence newsletter which was started last quarter continues to be well accepted by customer units. In addition to providing current information and guidelines, each newsletter contains nice to know information such as how bread, filled milk, and cottage cheese are manufactured.

(5) A method was initiated to allow unit fund organizations to make cash purchases of bulk subsistence items. Meats and perishables can only be sold by case lots. A Post Exchange delicatessen which allows individual purchases of meats and other perishables will be opened soon.

(6) During this period a manual packaged class III products inventory system was established within the command. This system replaced ADP accounting procedures and has effected more intensive managements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(7) An aggressive retrograde program of packaged class III products was initiated to eliminate excesses. Retention quantities were based on up-dated requisition objectives. The total inventory at the beginning of the quarter was 13,482.6 Short Tons. This was reduced to 10,200.4 S/T at the end of the quarter.

(8) On 5 July 1969 the "DSU Asset Balance Program" was initiated on a trial basis. This program consolidates the stock status of Direct Support Units (DSU) authorized stockage lists into one easily read printout. The primary purpose of this program is to provide a means for DSU Commanders to effect a command cross-leveling procedure. The printout will also provide easier access to information required for ten of the First Logistical Command supply improvement programs. This will reduce much of the nonsupply work presently in the Direct Support Units by providing the commander and the manager with a comprehensive and comparative supply management tool to determine areas needing improvement.

(9) During this period a critical shortage of plywood and one-inch lumber of all widths seriously hampered engineer, repair and utility work in the area supported by this Command. Both items are in short supply throughout USARV. The approximate lead time for shipment from CONUS is 100 to 200 days. Both items were on Project STOP/SEE until April 1969. Stringent controls were in effect for approximately 90 days, but operational requirements completely depleted stockage and established sizeable due outs.

(10) A study of asphalt requirements conducted during the period revealed that certain types of asphalt were urgently required for continuation of road building operations in the southern half of the II Corps Tactical Zone. Engineer asphalt requirements may be met by stocking four types of asphalt (AP-3, RC-70, MC-80C and Feneprime).

(11) At the end of the period, a survey of Material Handling Equipment shortages revealed that units assigned to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay were lacking 133 items of equipment.

g. ACofS, Services

(1) Engineering:

(a) During the reporting period on the Cam Ranh Bay Installation, maintenance of operational facilities continued to be a major problem. The seawall between piers 1 and 2 failed on 1 June. The helipad used for hooking operations had deteriorated to the point where it became hazardous for aircraft using the facility. The surfaces of piers 3 and 5 were deteriorating to the point where it would soon become necessary to close both facilities. The lack of engineer construction effort available to the command precluded proper maintenance on the facilities, permitting deterioration to the point that the facilities became unusable.

(b) Emergency repair was made on the seawall failure to prevent further damage; however, the repair precludes unloading barges onto the only port hardstand, causes loss of required hardstand, and prevents efficient unloading of RO/RO ships. During July the installation has received an increase

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

in engineer effort. Contract construction has started on the USAMMAM bulkhead repair and resurfacing of pier 2, and has resumed on Ammunition Area Charlie. The 595th Engineer Company (LE) was deployed to Cam Ranh Bay to begin construction on selected projects. These projects include: construction of access road between Ammunition Areas Charlie and Yankee, construction of 100 berms in the 3 ammunition areas, construction of fire roads in tank farms, drainage maintenance, and other much needed projects. This unit has been deployed to Cam Ranh Bay for a four month period, which will provide some assistance, but more engineer effort is required for an extended period of time.

(2) Graves Registration: The remains of 137 US Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance personnel were processed through USASUPCOM-CRB collecting points during the reporting period.

(3) Laundry and Bath:

(a) Bath facilities were deployed in support of 2/1 Cav operations during the period. One field shower was deployed and two decontamination trucks were sent to act as field expedient shower units.

(b) The laundry contract with the Modern Service Company was renewed effective 1 July 1969. In addition, a contract was awarded to Dang Van Minh to also provide laundry service to the Nha Trang area; this contract was effective 1 July 1969. Field laundry facilities are located at Cam Ranh, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang, Rao Loc, and Phan Thiet. The Dalat LSA receives its laundry support through a contracted facility.

(4) Food Service:

(a) During the period, thirty-eight (38) 1st Logistical Command food facilities were evaluated each month by the food service personnel of this headquarters. Twenty-four (24) "Star Plaque Awards" were presented to superior mess facilities.

(b) Effective 1 July 1969, the commissary accounting period changed from fiscal month (25th - 24th) to calendar month, 1st through last day of the month. All class I, mess and commissary records maintained on a commissary accounting period were changed accordingly.

(5) Bakery: During the reporting period, a total of 1,307,412 lbs of bread were produced and distributed by the Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay field bakeries.

(6) Property Disposal:

(a) During July, the retrograde responsibility was realigned in the command. ACofS, Services was relieved of responsibility for this activity and all action was transferred to ACofS, Supply, ACofS, Transportation, and ACofS, Maintenance.

(b) During the reporting period, the two property Disposal Yards within this command processed 3,275 short tons of usable property and 5,333 short tons of scrap. Approximately \$1,614,460 of usable property was reissued to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

various units within this command while the remaining property was listed for sale. Contracts were awarded to Schiavone - Chase Corp for a two year term scrap metal contract and Giant Tire Company for 700 short tons of scrap rubber per year. The contract with Stainless Processing Company, performing salvage operations under contract 92-112-300R-2, expired on 29 June 1969. The contractor was given a 15 day extension, followed by a 15 day default period, to fulfill the obligations of the contract. This extended the contract through 1 August 1969.

1 Shiavone - Chase Corp will remove monthly from Cam Ranh Bay:

- a 14,000 lbs aluminium
- b 8,400 lbs brass
- c 7,000 lbs copper
- d 14,000 lbs lead
- e 13,500 lbs stainless steel
- f 56,250 lbs cast iron
- g 56,250 lbs light steel
- h 112,500 lbs heavy steel

2 All specialized equipment in both yards is onhand. Some equipment has been installed and the remainder is awaiting engineer support.

3 A new scrap collection point has been set up at Phan Rang Air Base. It is satellited on the Cam Ranh Bay Activity and scrap is sold on contract.

h. Signal AN/GRC-142: On 1 June 1969, the AN/GRC-142 radio, a medium power, general use, vehicular radio set primarily for use in radio tele-type-writer operations, replaced the AN/GRC-46 and the AN/GRC-26 radios operating in the USASUPCOM-CRB RTT net. The AN/GRC-142 radio gives the USASUPCOM-CRB RTT net the capability of operating a secure half duplex voice and teletype net to the LSAs at Dalat, Bao Loc, Ban Me Thuot, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, and the 54th GS Group at Nha Trang. This RTT net is operational 24 hours a day. At the present time, this net is operating insecure because most stations in net cannot provide proper security to install secure COMSEC equipment in the AN/GRC-142 radio. The AN/GRC-142 has proven entirely satisfactory as it provides a better quality circuit and is a more rugged piece of radio equipment.

i. Provost Marshal:

(1) During the reporting period, continuous command emphasis was placed on the reduction of SIR's. Thirty-six (36) SIR's were processed involving personnel or equipment under the control of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. This is a reduction of four (4) over the previous reporting period. The no-questions-asked turn-in of unauthorized weapons is believed to have had a direct influence on the reduction of SIR's. This program is still in effect as a permanent program.

16 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) The overall discipline, law and order experience of the Command has shown improvement with exception of miscellaneous offenses. In this area, an increase of fourteen (14) incidents is largely due to increased emphasis on detection and apprehension of persons possessing or using marijuana.

(b) Crime against person and property - Thirty-four (34). A reduction of forty-five (45).

(c) Military offenses/incidents - 126. A reduction of 84.

(d) Miscellaneous offenses - 95. An increase of 14.

(e) Traffic offenses - 198. A reduction of 109.

(f) Special Command emphasis was given to the reduction of speeding offenses during this reporting period. Traffic Safety Patrols were initiated by the Command for this purpose. Traffic offenses were reduced from 307 in the previous reporting period to 198 in this reporting period.

(2) Physical Security: The Pass Exchange System suggested in the Cole Report was initiated on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. The first point of entry to begin the Pass Exchange was the Cam Ranh Village Checkpoint. The My Ca Checkpoint will begin the Pass Exchange System on 2 August 1969. The Vietnamese National Police are assisting in the implementation of this system.

j. Information: During the reporting period, the Information Office submitted 43 News Releases, 60 Photo Releases, 899 Home Town News Releases, and 74 Home Town Taped Interviews. The Information Office also hosted 18 correspondents representing various news media to include NBC News, Washington Post, DA Motion Picture Team, and Wellington Times (New Zealand).

k. Chaplain: Attendance at religious services is on a gradual increase. This increase is due to three factors: Increased command emphasis, exerted effort by the unit chaplains and the installation of air conditioners in three of the chapels.

2.(C)Section II - Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. ACofS, Personnel

(1) Morale Questionnaire:

(a) Observation: In April 1969, the 1st Logistical Command Morale Council requested each command to consider ways and means of measuring morale. Previously, a statistical summarization of adverse incident rates had been developed by this command, but it was found that this negative indicator did not accurately assess the true status of morale within a unit.

(b) Evaluation: The US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay Morale Council developed a morale questionnaire to enable unit and battalion commanders and their morale councils to evaluate and initiate action and projects which would improve morale. The questionnaire asks the individual to state the factors which improve morale, reduce morale, and what should be changed within

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the unit. It also asks for a brief evaluation of the morale of the unit. Results of the morale questionnaire survey as reported by subordinate commanders show the following factors have a significant effect on morale:

1 Factors which raise morale: Movies, company parties, good food, Special Services shows, Red Cross activities, unit clubs, time off, day rooms, basketball courts and sports programs.

2 Factors which reduce morale: Long working hours and inadequate time off, poor conditions in living quarters, details, poor selection of food in mess halls, laundry problems, and early morning formations. While some of the reported conditions are necessary for maintaining an effective military organization, the survey also reveals conditions which can be improved by command action.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that company and battalion sized units administer a questionnaire similar to that described above on a periodic basis in order to assess the morale of the unit and to identify areas in which improvements may be made which will have a significant impact on morale.

(2) Wearing of Uniforms:

(a) Observation: In recent months there has been an excessive number of soldiers reporting to the replacement battalion whose appearance and dress did not meet the minimum standards. Officers from this headquarters have visited the Replacement Battalion for the purpose of inspecting the appearance and dress of the departing troops. The lack of haircuts was the major deficiency noted. Other problems included dirty, incomplete or altered uniforms.

(b) Evaluation: Troops without complete uniforms were prohibited from boarding the aircraft. In view of the number of personnel observed attempting to proceed on Special Leave in the fatigue uniform, a Command Letter was prepared by this Command to provide a consolidation of current uniform requirements. Additionally, further definition of the acceptable standards of appearance was developed and published for guidance of all personnel.

(c) Recommendation: In view of recent changes in uniform requirements for various categories of travel which have resulted in a lack of accurate information being disseminated to all levels of command, it is recommended that the current uniform requirements for each type of travel and a definition of the acceptable standards of appearance be consolidated in a Command Letter to be published to all Army personnel in Vietnam.

(3) Personnel:

(a) Observation: Officer and enlisted strength have taken a sharp dip over the past few months and this is a pattern that seems to occur about the same time annually.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the fact that many servicemen, both officer and enlisted, try to move in the summer months so as not to disrupt the schooling of their children, a large loss of manpower results about this same time yearly. Efforts were made to accept as many people with later DERO's to ease this loss period as much as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Recommendations: Continue to accept officers with DROS's later in the year even if the retainability is a little low. This will help balance out the losses. Place stronger emphasis on the extension program especially during this period of the year.

(4) Base Postal Office:

(a) Observation: The 39th BPO took over the mission of the 575th APU, which had finance units inherent in the TOE for an APU. The BPO therefore performs the missions of a BPO as well as an APU, however, it only is staffed for a BPO. At present the unit maintains sixteen financial units in seven locations throughout II Corps Tactical Zone. None of these financial units are allocated for on the MTOE, therefore the personnel must be taken from the BPO MTOE. In the past six months two new APO's have been opened by the 39th BPO, however, no additional personnel are authorized.

(b) Evaluation: When individuals are removed from the BPO function to be utilized as finance clerks, the total effectiveness of mission accomplishment is hampered. At present, twenty-one (21) finance clerks are being utilized with no formal authorization, but needed as mission essential. The resources review board, CRB Support Command, has agreed that the unit remain at 130% strength which is approximately 86 personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That an MTOE be approved and additional slots be allocated for finance mission.

b. ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations.

(1) Request for Special Resupply Missions (CE's and ER's).

(a) Observation: Tactical units are requesting special resupply missions directly to the Support Command.

(b) Evaluation: When requests are received directly at the Support Command from tactical units before they have been requested through the local support activity or their tactical chain of command, response time is not decreased but greatly increased. Required justification and verification in turn must be acquired from the supporting activity or down through the tactical chain of command before action can be initiated. In many instances the request is not required and resupply can be accomplished at lower levels.

(c) Recommendation: That units be aware of procedures to follow in requesting special resupply missions, and that these procedures be followed.

(2) Convoy Ground Security.

(a) Observation: During the monsoon season, aircraft dedicated for convoy security are frequently grounded prior to, or after the convoy has begun to march.

(b) Evaluation: The loss of aircover when ground security is not provided greatly reduces convoy security and causes delay in resupply. Convoys are forced to remain, or proceed to the closest available secure area and remain until security can be provided.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Recommendation: During monsoon seasons, convoys be given ground troops as first priority, and gunships as second. VR aircraft should be used in conjunction with ground troops when possible since it provides additional security, show of force, and enables the convoy commander an additional means of communication to maintain better control over his convoy.

(3) Convoy Frequencies:

(a) Observation: Situations have existed where the VR aircraft or gunships have not had correct convoy frequencies, or that the convoy itself was on an incorrect frequency.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of communication between a convoy and its security greatly enhances the chances for the enemy in conducting a successful ambush. Only when fire power is immediately available through the VR aircraft or gunships can the convoy obtain the necessary security for a safe arrival at destination. In addition, time spent in establishing communications result in unnecessary delay of convoys, and resupply to end stations.

(c) Recommendation: Close coordination be affected between units involved to insure frequencies are correct and passed to the security forces. When passed over the line by voice, individuals must be aware of the procedures i using KAC codes to avoid compromise and to insure information is correct.

c. ACofS, Maintenance.

(1) Maintenance

(a) Observation: Personnel turbulence in many of the critical maintenance and supply MOS fields has hampered the accomplishment of the maintenance mission. Recently arriving personnel are inexperienced and in many cases direct from technical schools with no OJT.

(b) Evaluation: Closer supervision and program of continuing education are necessary to overcome these obstacles. Training must be both classroom and OJT type.

(c) Recommendation: Continued command emphasis, at all levels of command, must be provided in the areas of maintenance and supply procedures.

(2) Forklifts:

(a) Observation: It is the opinion of this section that the majority of deadlines within the command are due to a large number of forklift operators not having proper training on the operation and maintenance procedures incidental to their respective equipment.

(b) Evaluation: The current high demand for parts is directly proportionate to the MOS trained personnel and OJT personnel. And in most places good operational procedures. This has caused an excessive high consumption of repair parts and needless expense.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Recommendations: It is therefore recommended that efforts to procure more MOS trained personnel for TO&E slots be made.

(3) Radar Maintenance.

(a) Observation: It has been conclusively demonstrated that this SUPCOM's capacity for radar maintenance is severely hampered by factors beyond its control. In the month of July, there were three instances where a counter-mortar radar set was deadlined for reasons other than the generator power source. Yet in each of these instances, a critical portion of the radar set was burned up by fluctuating and surging voltage coming from the generators. Two of the three pieces burned were repaired in CRB but the third part required evacuation to Saigon.

(b) Evaluation: In each of the three instances in July it was known that the generators were erratic. The instability took its toll by burning up three components in three different radar sets. When the generators were first determined to be erratic they should have been shut down immediately and thoroughly checked by a DSU generator mechanic. Each site had only one generator and, therefore, had to continue to run until they were forced to close down by a mechanical failure. This could have been averted if a backup generator had been available.

(c) Conclusion: Both IFFV and 1st Log have been advised of the critical posture of these generator sets and requested to consider an MTOE or a temporary loan of the necessary generators to alleviate the problem.

d. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Observation: Missed milk flights by Air Force aircraft have resulted in several disruptions of milk supply to outlying areas of support, and on some occasions, late notification by the Air Force of flight cancellation has caused complete loss of several thousand dollars worth of milk through spoilage.

(2) Evaluation: There appears to be a lack of flexibility resulting in loss of a perishable product as well as potentially reducing morale of the combat personnel depending on the fresh milk support.

(3) Recommendation: Recommend that firm commitments for reliable support be arranged with the Air Force so as to insure that operations personnel feel a sense of urgency for delivery of perishable cargo.

e. ACofS, Ammunition

(1) Unit Moves in Phan Thiet Area.

(a) Observation: During this reporting period several unit moves by an Infantry Battalion (-) and an Artillery Battery resulted in erratic draws from ASP's.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Evaluation: In some cases units deployed with less than their authorized basic load resulting in heavy draws on the ASP.

(c) Recommendation: In order to insure immediate, responsive ammunition supply, coordination must be accomplished at the earliest possible date so that units may deploy with authorized basic loads.

(2) Security at LSA's.

(a) Observation: During the month of July the ASP's at Ban Me Thuot and Bao Loc were closed primarily due to decreased security capability in those areas.

(b) Evaluation: It must be emphasized that if LSA ASP's are to remain open, proper security measures and forces must be available to properly protect ASP's.

(c) Recommendation: Adequate security forces must be available to protect ASP's at LSA's.

(3) Field Returns.

(a) Observation: Cam Ranh Bay Support Command is currently experiencing an increase in unserviceable unit returns.

(b) Evaluation: The surveillance and maintenance capability of the command is fully committed. Receipt of increased unserviceables will only add to the strain already existent upon those elements performing this mission.

(c) Recommendation: Using units should be enjoined to use proper field storage and handling procedures. The condition of Class V field returns must be improved so as to minimize the required maintenance effort.

X f. ACofS, Supply

(1) Backload Capability:

(a) Observation: During the mid part of the quarter, a T-1 petroleum shuttle tanker was backloaded while berthed at the T-2 POL jetty. Shuttle tankers normally receive product from in-stream ship to ship transfer.

(b) Evaluation: The breasting dolphins at the T-2 jetty are spaced too far apart to accomodate T-1 Petroleum tankers. To moor a T-1 tanker on the jetty, only the stern can be stabilized by a breasting dolphin. The bow is stabilized by the tanker's starboard anchor. Under these conditions, a high wind could cause the tanker to shift into the jetty thus causing severe damage to the discharge facility.

(c) Recommendation: Construction design of petroleum discharge facilities should be planned to provide adequate accommodations for backloading smaller sized petroleum tankers. This could be effectively accomplished by employing additional dolphins or by spacing dolphins closer together.

2.2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Containerized Drum Shipments:

(a) Observation: A containerized shipment of 5040 drums of lube oil was received during the quarter.

(b) Evaluation: Closed containers stuffed with 55 gallon drums are extremely difficult to unload. The drums, each weighing approximately 500 lbs, must be manually removed from the container before MHE can be employed. Unstuffing is a slow process and necessitates the utilization of personnel from other areas of operations.

(c) Recommendation: Drummed product should only be shipped by container when necessity dictates and other modes of sea movement are not available.

(3) Condemnation losses:

(a) Observation: Significant amounts of high acid non-perishables were lost due to beetle infestation.

(b) Evaluation: During the month of June large amounts of flour, noodles, and crackers were condemned due to beetle infestation. The beetle (Tribolium Confusum) proliferated within the starch products in the warm climatic conditions of CRB. Also lost were significant amounts of high acid non-perishables, such as tomato juice, cherries and plums.

(c) Recommendation: The Subsistence Division has taken preventative measures to preclude reoccurrence of such losses by reducing stockages of these items. It has requested lowering of depot stockage objectives for non-perishables, early detection and elimination of infested products before proliferation of insects can result.

(4) Transfer of Class I support of Bao Loc and Dalat from Phan Rang to Cam Ranh Bay.

(a) Observation: That improved support of the two above mentioned LSA's could be effected from Cam Ranh Bay by daily Special Mission Air Request (SMAR) flights.

(b) Evaluation: Through the use of Cam Ranh based, C-130 SMAR flights, fresh dairy products and other perishables can be delivered to the Bao Loc and Dalat LSA's with minimum loss of quality.

(c) Recommendation: That continued support of Bao Loc and Dalat be provided by Class I ration breakdown at CRB.

(5) Bulk cash sales and PX delicatessen:

(a) Observation: In the absence of a commissary store in Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang and Phan Rang, a retail outlet was necessary for bulk purchases or subsistence items on a non-recurring basis. Also a retail outlet for individual purchases of frozen meats, luncheon meats, cheese, milks, produce

CONFIDENTIAL

and relishes was needed.

(b) Evaluation: Due to sporadic outbreaks of pilferage of Class I items, cash sales outlets were needed for Class I Purchases. Through application of USARV Reg 31-200, Class I officers can permit non-recurring purchases of case lot perishables and unit of issue non-perishables by unit funds and other approved organizations. To further alleviate the pilferage problem, a PX delicatessen will soon be opened to provide individual customers with fresh subsistence items.

(c) Recommendations: That bulk cash sales of subsistence items from Class I commissaries be continued and the proposed PX delicatessen be opened within the near future.

g. ACofS, Services

(1) Facilities Engineering Support:

(a) Observation: Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc. (PA&E), the contractor providing real property management in Cam Ranh Bay, is neither manned nor equipped to perform its mission. Examples are as follows:

1 Only 17 people are assigned to the roads and ground crew which is supposed to maintain all the roads on post. Since most of the roads are constructed on sand and stabilized with peneprime, the mission is far too great for only 17 people.

2 The contractor has the mission of emptying the sumps on post; however, USAECAV has not provided PA&E with the sump trucks, which are government furnished equipment in the contract. A survey made on 28 and 29 July 1969 of 47 sumps indicated that 11 were overflowing and 16 required pumping at least once a week.

3 PA&E also does not have the capability of asphalt paving. A roller is authorized, but none is on hand.

(b) Evaluation: A realistic review must be made on the capability of the contractor and a practical course of action developed.

(c) Recommendation: That PA&E be provided the equipment and personnel necessary to perform its mission satisfactorily, or additional engineer units be organized to supplement PA&E effort.

(2) Engineer Support:

(a) Observation: Engineer construction effort at Cam Ranh Bay increased during the reporting period. The troop effort provided however, is only temporary. The 595th Engineer Company (LE) will work at Cam Ranh Bay for only a four month period, 1 July to 1 November 1969. There are sufficient critical horizontal construction projects at Cam Ranh Bay to utilize this unit for an extended period of time. The engineer unit does lack a source of rock which is necessary to construct wearing surfaces over the sand-cement stabilized base. In addition to horizontal construction projects, there are

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

many critical waterfront projects awaiting effort. The contractor is working on one project; however, the waterfront facilities are deteriorating at about the same rate as the contractor is repairing them.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of available engineer effort has allowed for the deterioration of many Cam Ranh Bay facilities to a point where they have become unusable and require replacement. In general, drainage over the entire installation requires considerable effort to prevent serious loss and damage to facilities during the approaching monsoon season. The 595th Engineer Company during its programmed stay at this installation will not be able to complete all of the projects tasked to the unit. More waterfront construction maintenance capability is required to maintain existing facilities, complete projects which were not completed by troops in the past, and to construct newly required facilities.

(c) Recommendations:

1. The 595th Engineer Company (LE) be retained at Cam Ranh Bay to continue working on critical projects.

2. The 595th Engineer Company (LE) be provided with a source of rock.

3. A port construction unit be deployed ASAP to Cam Ranh Bay to commence working on critical waterfront projects.

3. (U) Section III - Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information:
NONE.

8 Incl
as
Incls 1 - 8 wd HQ, DA


ROBERT J. KEELER
Colonel, TC
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-MH (8 Aug 69) 1 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, CRB for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384. 1 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375.

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, USASUPCOM, CRB for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Morale Questionnaire, page 17, paragraph a(1). Chapter 3, Department of Army Pamphlet 350-14, "Training Guide for Commanders of Company Size Units", contains a list of evidence of high morale and recommends actions to commanders which will improve morale. This office cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the morale questionnaire used at Cam Ranh Bay at this time. Action will be taken to inquire into this leadership tool and following evaluation, a recommendation will be forwarded to Cam Ranh Bay.

b. Reference item concerning Wearing of Uniforms, page 18, paragraph 2(a). Standards of appearance and uniform requirements have been consolidated and outlined in USARV Regulation 670-5, dated 24 August 1969.

c. Reference item concerning Personnel, page 18, paragraph a(3). Concur that extensions should be encouraged. Nonconcur with the observation that enlisted strength has indicated a sharp decline over the past few months. On 1 May 1969, USASUPCOM, CRB was at 85% of authorized enlisted strength while on 31 July it was at 99% of authorized enlisted strength.

d. Reference item concerning Base Post Off .e, page 19, paragraph a(4). Concur. The MTOE submitted by 39th BDE in March 69, was returned to USASUPCOM, CRB, on 11 March 69 for preparation in accordance with 1st Log Comd Circular 310-4, and identification of trade-off spaces from within the Support Command. Additional justification was also requested. If the requirement is still valid, the MTOE action should be resubmitted, with identification of trade-off spaces.

e. Reference item concerning Request for Special Resupply Missions, page 19, paragraph b(1). Concur. Procedures for request of Combat Essential (CE) or Emergency Resupply (ER) missions are contained in the 55-4 regulation published by each headquarters. Increased instances of where demands are placed directly on the SUPCOM's for CE or ER action by tactical forces indicates that the regulations are not specific and require clarification. In addition, it is not clear when a CE or ER should be processed through 1st Logistical Command channels and when it should be processed through tactical channels. Close liaison and coordination between supported and supporting forces will tend to resolve some

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVC1 GO-MH (8 Aug 69) 1 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, CRB for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFR-65. (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384. 1 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST, APO 96375.

of the problems; however, more specific guidance is required on which various headquarters can base regulations and procedures. Recommend that HQ, USARV revise regulation 55-4 to provide circumstances under which a CT or ER is to be requested through tactical channels and when it is to be requested through LSC/SUPCOM/1st Logistical Command channels.

f. Reference item concerning Convoy Ground Security, page 19, paragraph 2b(2). Nonconcur. The provision of combat personnel for convoy security, particularly in an area of low enemy threat, is not in accordance with the assigned mission for tactical elements. In the instance cited where aircraft were not available because of inclement weather, it would be more appropriate for the transportation units to increase the number of convoy security personnel from their own resources; e.g., the "shotgun" rider principle.

g. Reference item concerning Convoy Frequencies, page 20, paragraph b(3). Concur. Close coordination is a necessity in this situation. However this coordination should be made prior to the time the convoy is scheduled to depart. The proper use of KAC codes is a unit training responsibility and should be made a part of each unit's mandatory training program.

h. Reference item concerning Maintenance, page 20, paragraph 2c(1). Concur that command emphasis at all echelons should be provided in the areas of maintenance and supply procedures. This command has an intensive training program, Project SKI IS I, which provides for both classroom and "J" training.

i. Reference item concerning Forklifts, page 20, paragraph c(2). Concur. This command has been experiencing a continuing critical shortage of personnel in M16 62M10. As of the close of this period this command was at 24% of authorized strength in this MCB.

j. Reference item concerning Radar Maintenance, page 21, paragraph c(3). Concur. Action has been taken to transfer a Signal Radar Maintenance Team (SRT) to USARV, CRB. An emergency authorization request for 10KW, 400 cycle generators, UU-204C, was forwarded to DA from USARV on 21 May 69. Upon approval of this request, 1st Log Comd Signal Radar Maintenance Detachments will have requisitioning authority.

k. Reference item concerning Missed Milk Flights, page 21, paragraph d. Concur. Commitments for USAF flights are made through normal TMI channels.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-MH (8 Aug 69) 1 Ind

1 OCT 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, CRB for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

The many variables which affect aircraft missions, including weather, enemy activity, aircraft availability, priority missions, etc. make firm commitments to any mission impossible. The use of the established system of transportation priorities will insure commitment of available assets to missions in order of their priority.

1. Reference item concerning Unit Moves in Phan Thiet Area, page 21, paragraph e(1). Concur. If the tactical units give sufficient advance notice, better Class V support can be accomplished. Recommend that closer coordination be effected between the support command, Division Ammunition Officers, and Division Support Command Commanders. No action required by higher headquarters.

m. Reference item concerning Security at LSA's, page 22, paragraph e(2). The closing of the Bao Loc ASP was also due to the small amount of Class V being issued on a daily basis. Ban Me Thuot ASP has reopened as of 2 September with elements of the 4th Infantry Division providing security.

n. Reference item concerning Field Returns, page 22, paragraph e(3). Concur. Support command technical assistance teams should make this an area of emphasis during their periodic visits to the using units. Recommend that HQ, USARV ammunition inspectors emphasize the need for proper storage and handling procedures during their visits to the tactical units.

o. Reference item concerning Backload Capability, page 22, paragraph f(1). Concur. The Cam Ranh Bay Support Command is in process of preparing a request for the construction of a third breasting dolphin to be used in conjunction with the T-2 'OL Jetty.

p. Reference item concerning Condemnation Losses, page 23, paragraph f(3). Concur except for lowering the stockage objective. The current stockage objective of 49 days is reasonable and because of variation in shipping schedules, lowering it is not in the best interest of supply control. Additional action has been taken to reduce stocks on hand to include interdepot transfer of items in long supply and revising procedures for determining nonperishable requirements by applying actual consumption experience to projected troop strength.

q. Reference item concerning Facilities Engineer Support, page 24, paragraph g(1). Concur in part. The number of personnel employed in the Roads and Grounds section is 50 as of the last report on 13 Aug 69, not 17 as stated in the ORLL. Since the contractor works on an incentive awards contract, comments concerning his ability or inability to perform should be reported to the installation engineer who grades the contractor performance. Shortage of sump trucks is not as critical as stated in the ORLL. During the contract negotiations both the US Army and the contractor agreed that 91 sump trucks would be adequate to pump all the authorized sums in Vietnam. Presently 8 trucks are on hand and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVC GO-MH (8 Aug 69) 1 Ind

1 OCT 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, CRB for Period
Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

83 sump trucks are on requisition. Requisitions were placed in March 69. Until
the requisitions are filled 75 sump trucks are being leased by PAVE to perform
the mission. The same general situation applies to the shortage of motorized
rollers.

r. Reference item concerning Engineer Support, page 24, paragraph g(2).
HQ, USARV recognized the need for horizontal construction effort at Cam Ranh
Bay and dispatched the 595th Engineer Light Equipment Company to Cam Ranh
Bay with 15 construction directives. It now appears that the completion of all
15 projects would require the effort of the company through 31 March 1970. A
letter requesting the postponement of the relocation of the 595th Engineer Co.
(L.) has been prepared and forwarded to USARV. A source of rock for construction
is available from the R&M contractor. The 497th Port Construction Co. was
deployed to Cam Ranh Bay as of 1 Sep 69 to work on waterfront projects,

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

For the COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839



C. D. STAFFORD
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

OF:
USASUPCOM, CRB

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (8 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay
for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RC3 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1969

TO: Commander In Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support
Command, Cam Ranh Bay.


2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Request for Special Resupply Missions
(CE's and ER's)", section II, page 19, paragraph 2b(1); concur. MACV Directive
55-4, dated 5 Sep 69, Annex 3, prescribes the procedures for requesting emer-
gency airlift. A message will be dispatched referring Army Commands to this
directive. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning "Forklifts", section II, page 20, paragraph
2c(2); concur. Every effort is being made to furnish properly qualified fork-
lift operators but it must be recognized that the sustaining base in CONUS
does not provide sufficient opportunity for the development of this relatively
low level of skill. OJT has and will continue to be one of the largest
sources of qualified forklift operators.

c. Reference item concerning "Field Returns", section II, page 22, para-
graph 2e(3); concur. USARV Reg 700-7 dated 30 Jun 68, USARV Reg 742-1, dated
1 Mar 68, and USARV letter, AVHGD-AM, subj: Ammunition Safety Quantity Dis-
tance Standards at Tactical Bases and Base Camps, dated 24 Jul 68 prescribes
the procedures required to maintain unit basic loads. Ammunition Inspection
Specialists assigned to the USARV G4 Ammunition Division perform semiannual
technical assistance visits to each unit involved in handling and storing
ammunition basic loads in RVN. Ammunition personnel are available for courtesy
technical assistance visits and orientation of personnel upon request by the
command. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. D. WILSON, Major NAC
1LT, AAC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USA Spt Cmd, CRB
1st Log Cmd

GPOP-DT (8 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command
Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP

4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.
AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

5. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REPS
8 August 1969	34	
6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	693331	
b. PROJECT NO.	8b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned (file report))	
c. N/A		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
N/A		
12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY		
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		
13. ABSTRACT		

32

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification